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DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION REFORMS IN TRANSITIONAL
ECONOMIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM MONGOLIA,
NEPAL, UKRAINE, AND ZIMBABWE
William E. Kovacic*

INTRODUCTION

In November 1992, I traveled to Mongolia to assist in a process
which led to Mongolia's adoption of an antimonopoly law. During a
seminar in Ulaanbataar for Mongolian government officials on
merger enforcement, I described how some countries recognize a
"safe harbor" in which firms with small market shares can merge
without fear of challenge by public antitrust authorities. The translator quickly told me that the safe harbor metaphor lacked meaning
in a landlocked nation. After searching for a phrase that would
work in a country of no ports but many herders, we decided that
"peaceful pasture" was a suitable way to capture the idea of creating zones of transactional immunity.'
The discussion of peaceful pastures in merger enforcement provided one reminder of the many challenges posed by efforts to design and implement competition policy laws in countries undergoing
the transition from central planning to a market economy. Estab* Professor, George Mason University School of Law. The author is grateful to the DePaul
University College of Law and the DePaul Law Review for sponsoring the conference for which
this paper was prepared. The author thanks the University of Maryland Center for Institutional
Reform and the Informal Sector and the United States Agency for International Development for
funding the technical assistance projects that provided the basis for this paper. The author also
has benefitted from many discussions about the role of law reform in transitional economies with
James Anderson, Kul Ratna Bhurtyal, Linda Boner, Roger Boner, Charles Cadwell, Cynthia
Clement, Ramesh Dhungel, Praveen Dixit, George Gamota, Prakash Ghimire, Georges Korsun,
Peter Murrell, Mancur Olson, and Robert Thorpe, who also provided comments on an earlier
draft. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author alone.
1. When speaking through a translator to an audience having little familiarity with market
economics, it is important to articulate one's thoughts clearly and deliberately. In another seminar
in Mongolia, I hastily mentioned that "law and economics" had greatly influenced judicial thinking about antitrust policy in the United States. From my rushed presentation, the interpreter
thought I had spoken of "lawn economics." At the seminar's end, one participant said that only a
wealthy capitalist nation such as the United States could develop a subspecialty of economics
devoted to the study of residential landscaping.
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lishing a competition policy system in formerly socialist or communist nations entails far reaching changes. These include drafting and
enacting new legislation; forming new government institutions; educating business managers, government administrators, judges, and
the public about the role of competition in a market system; and, in
some instances, even so basic a step as creating a new vocabulary to
describe market phenomena and concepts central to competition policy analysis.
Since 1980, many formerly communist or socialist nations have
enacted new antimonopoly and consumer protection laws or bolstered existing measures. 2 A number of other countries are considering new antitrust or consumer protection statutes to facilitate the
transition from planning to markets. 3 To draft and implement such
measures, multinational donor groups and individual Western nations have sponsored a wide array of technical assistance programs.
Experience with antimonopoly and consumer protection initiatives
since the late 1980s provides a basis for evaluating how these and
other law reform efforts can best be implemented in transitional
economies. In the past three years, I have participated in antitrust
or consumer protection law reform projects in Mongolia, Nepal,
Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. Each consultation has been sponsored by
the United States Agency for International Development (AID),
and the programs in Mongolia, Nepal, and Ukraine have taken
place under the aegis of the University of Maryland's Center for
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS). This Article
draws on these projects, discussing approaches for designing and im2. See, e.g., ANA JULIA JATAR, COMPETITION POLICY IN LATIN-AMERICA: THE PROMOTION OF

A SOCIAL CHANGE 2-3 (1995) (describing adoption of competition laws in Latin American and
European countries undergoing economic liberalization); Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Mexico's New
InstitutionalFrameworkfor Antitrust Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1149 (1995) (discussing
content of Mexico's new antitrust law); Clive S. Gray & Anthony A. Davis, Competition Policy in
Developing Countries Undergoing Structural Adjustment, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 425, 427-28
(1993) (describing adoption of antimonopoly legislation as element of structural adjustment in
developing countries); William E. Kovacic & Robert S. Thorpe, Antitrust and the Evolution of a
Market Economy in Mongolia, in COMPETITION POLICY AND DEMONOPOLIZATION IN THE POST-

COMMUNIST ECONOMIES (Ben Slay, ed., forthcoming) (describing Mongolia's adoption of a new
antimonopoly law); Robert G. Vaughn, Consumer Protection Laws in South America, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1994) (examining origins and content of new consumer protection laws in South America).
3. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, Economic Development, and the Transition to Free Markets in the Third World." The Case of Zimbabwe, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 253-54
(1992) [hereinafter Kovacic, Competition Policy] (discussing Zimbabwe's consideration of a new
antitrust system).
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plementing law reforms.
Part I of this Article describes the possible contributions of antitrust and consumer protection systems in promoting the development of free markets in transitional economies. This Article treats
consumer protection laws along with antitrust legislation due to the
overlap between the two in some transitional economies. Consumer
protection laws in transitional economies sometimes contain provisions - such as a ban on cartelization or restrictions on advertising
- with significant antimonopoly and competition policy implications.4 Antitrust laws in such countries occasionally contain consumer protection articles dealing with business torts and deceptive
trade practices. 5 Part II discusses features of the transitional economy environment relevant to the design and implementation of antitrust and consumer protection reforms, and Part III considers the
implications of these conditions in proposing methods for devising
and carrying out antitrust and consumer protection reforms. Although the Article focuses on antitrust and consumer protection initiatives, its observations often apply to other economic law reform
activities in transitional economies.
I.

THE RATIONALE FOR ANTITRUST AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
PROGRAMS

The case for establishing antitrust and consumer protection systems as part of transitional economy legal reform is not self-evident.
Commentators have raised three basic criticisms about such measures. The first criticism views antitrust and consumer protection
laws as excessively prone to misapplication in the form of corrupt,
unduly aggressive, or arbitrary enforcement that can discourage investment and growth. 6 With antitrust laws, a common fear is that
4. See infra note 10 (discussing antitrust and consumer protection laws in transitional
economies).
5. See infra note 10 (discussing antitrust and consumer protection laws in transitional
economies).
6. See Armando E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust
Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 209, 222-27 (1994)
(describing enforcement problems with antitrust laws, indicating that these laws may run counter
to perceived national interests); Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in Post-Communist
Economies, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 45-46 (1994) (describing the ineffectiveness and limitations
of antitrust laws in developing countries); see also Vladimir E. Capelik, Should Monopoly be
Regulated in Russia?. 6 COMMUNIST COUNTRIES & ECON. TRANSFORMATION 19, 22-24 (1994)
(describing dangers of applying an excessively broad definition of "monopoly enterprise" or "dominant firm" in determining which companies are to be included on Russia's state register of mo-
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enforcement authorities will use limitations on dominant firm behavior to punish all conduct that results in the disappearance of a rival,
or to treat dominant firm price increases as evidence of improper
exploitation and a basis for imposing variants of price controls. Major concerns with consumer protection laws are that the government
will establish intrusive controls on the substance of bargains between sellers and buyers, and that expansive interpretations of bans
against false or misleading advertising will discourage sellers from
providing consumers with useful information.
A second basic criticism is that transitional economies can accomplish the most important competition policy objectives more effectively by directly facilitating the movement of goods across national
and regional borders. Put another way, the best antitrust policy
might consist of greater appropriations for airports, roads, and rail
links; policies to encourage investment in communications infrastructure; the elimination of government restrictions on entry; and
the dismantling of quota and tariff barriers to imports. 8 Similarly, a
consumer protection policy might best take the form of efforts to
increase the reliability of contract enforcement, along with the recognition of doctrines that void agreements induced by fraud.
The third criticism is that efforts to create antitrust and consumer
protection systems divert attention and scarce national resources
away from more important law reform priorities.9 During a trip to
Kiev in January 1995, I spoke on several occasions with a real estate
investment entrepreneur who described how infirmities in rudimentary legal institutions impede investment and commercial activity in
nopoly enterprises).
7. See ROBERT D. COOTER, MARKET MODERNIZATION OF LAW 31 (1995) ("Developing nations can accomplish many goals of antitrust policy through free trade without the state creating
an enforcement bureaucracy.").
8. See ANNETTE W. BROWN ET. AL., THE MYTH OF MONOPOLY: A NEW VIEW OF INDUSTRIAL
STRUCTURE IN RUSSIA 38-39 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1331: 1993)
(describing how elimination of regional and local curbs on entry and movement of goods could
improve Russia's system of distribution).
9. Paul Godek makes the point as follows:
East Europeans have limited resources and much more important things to worry
about at this precarious stage of their development. Worrying about antitrust issues
shows an unhealthy state of anxiety about the imagined ills of capitalism. Exporting
antitrust to Eastern Europe is like giving a silk tie to a starving man. It is superfluous:
a starving man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is knotted too tightly,
he will not be able to eat what little there is available to him.
Paul E. Godek, One U.S Export Eastern Europe Does Not Need, in REGULATION 20, 21 (Winter
1992).
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Ukraine. The entrepreneur wished to create a prototype subdivision
outside of Kiev, equipped with prefabricated homes built in the
United States and providing amenities such as a swimming pool and
security guards. Because Ukraine has no law that clearly permits
private ownership of interests in real estate, any effort to acquire
land (either a fee simple interest or a long-term lease) and build
permanent structures is beset with enormous uncertainty. In an environment of austere national resources, an argument could be made
for subordinating the pursuit of antitrust or consumer protection
legislation to the creation of legal institutions for defining and protecting property rights.
These concerns deserve serious attention. Yet there remains a potentially useful, positive role for well-conceived antitrust and consumer protection institutions in the transition to a market economy. 10 Their potential value comes in three forms. The first deals
with government activities that smother or distort market processes.
It is important not to underestimate the hostility or skepticism
among some elected officials, ministry leaders, and citizens' groups
in many transitional economies to market-oriented reforms." In
many instances, official opposition to reform is not expressed openly
(or is understated), so as not to draw opprobrium from donor entities, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
which have made market-oriented structural reforms preconditions
for continued financial assistance.' 2 Short of overt resistance, government authorities may seek to deflect market-based initiatives
through half-hearted implementation of nominal reforms or the use
of subtle administrative strategies for continuing state control of economic activity. In many transitional economies, market-oriented
10. For more sanguine assessments of the value of antitrust and consumer protection programs
in transitional economies, see James Langenfeld & Marsha W. Blitzer, Is Competition Policy the
Last Thing that Central and Eastern Europe Need?, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347, 367-76
(1991) (discussing the use of antitrust laws to create competition in Eastern and Central Europe);
Spencer Weber Waller & Rafael Muente, Competition Law for Developing Countries:A Proposal for an Antitrust Regime in Peru, 21 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 159, 159 (1989) (describing
how a system of competition laws is vital to the development of an effective national economy);
Robert D. Willig, Anti-Monopoly Policies and Institutions, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET
ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 187, 195 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. Rausser, eds. 1992)
(applauding emerging market economies for recognizing that "anti-monopoly policy is integral to
the process of transition").
11. See Jeffrey Sachs, In Defense of Russia's Reformers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1993, at A8
(describing "hand-to-hand combat" between economic reformers and the "communist old guard"
in Russia).
12. See Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 256.
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reforms have a tenuous foothold in public policy, and the success of
efforts to remove the state from unnecessary and destructive intervention in the economy is far from assured.
Antitrust and consumer protection mechanisms can provide an institutional voice within the government for the promotion of markets
and opposition to state efforts to suppress market processes. Antitrust and consumer protection institutions can attack government
policies that impede the development of markets and help ensure
that the state intervenes only to correct genuine market failures.
Among other approaches, competition and consumer protection authorities might be given a formal role in reviewing or approving the
decisions of other government ministries with respect to such matters as the issuance of licenses and the privatization of state-owned
firms. An antimonopoly or consumer protection agency may be the
only formal institutional counterweight to government efforts to deflect or obstruct market reforms.
A second useful function is to deal with private efforts to undermine market processes. There are (and will be) market failures that
present serious obstacles to the emergence of markets and are amenable to correction. For example, business actors in the new market
environment may experience a strong inclination to attempt to
achieve by private agreement the type of industry-wide orchestration of activity that government ministries formerly performed.
Carefully designed and focused antitrust and consumer protection
institutions can challenge private conduct - such as cartelization
and mergers to monopoly - that seriously threatens the successful
operation of a market system.
The third function is to establish institutions that provide actual
and symbolic assurance to the public and their elected officials that
the move to a market system does not leave citizens at the mercy of
market failures. In many environments, the realistic alternative to
antimonopoly or consumer protection legislation may be far more
intrusive forms of government intervention, including direct price
controls, broad limits on entry, and continued widespread public
ownership of business enterprises.
II.

THE IMPLEMENTATION CONTEXT

Antitrust and consumer protection law reform efforts in transitional economies do not occur in a vacuum. These and other law
reform initiatives take place in a distinctive national context, featur-
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ing a mix of commercial, government, social, and political institutions and circumstances with important implications for the substance and process of law reform. Studying and understanding these
conditions in the host country is crucial to designing and implementing constructive laws. Described below are some of the most important conditions that confront law reform programs in most transitional economy settings.
A.

The Commercial Context

To achieve economic progress, market-oriented law reform should
flow from a careful evaluation of the structure and patterns of commercial activity in the host country. In many transitional economies,
the national commercial context features the following traits.
1. Pervasive Role for the State
In most transitional economies today, the state continues to exercise broad control over commercial activity."3 The state's influence is
the residue of decades of central planning, in which individual
sectoral ministries exercised enormous economic and political power
through the oversight of state-owned business enterprises. 4 Despite
the adoption of economic liberalization measures, transitional economy governments shape commercial activity in many ways, including state ownership and management of business enterprises, severe
regulation of entry, diversification, and exit, and controls over pricing.' 5 Even where transitional economies have embarked on seem13. See Irina Starodubrovskaya, The Nature of Monopoly and Barriers to Entry in Russia, 6
COMMUNIST ECON. & ECON. TRANSFORMATION 3, 1-3 (1994) (describing how local authorities in

Russia continue to exercise control over commercial activity and obstruct competition).
14. See Paul J. Joskow et al., Competition Policy in Russia During and After Privatization,IN
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY and MICROECONoMIcs 301, 306-24 (Martin N.
Baily et. al., eds. 1994) (describing state oversight of business enterprises in Russia during the era
of central planning).
15. See e.g., JATAR, supra note 2, at 1-2 (describing how Latin American governments have
followed economic regulation such as price controls, state monopolistic practices, and government
ownership of industries and services and how many Latin American countries have not actively
enforced their antitrust laws); see also PETER MURRELL ET AL., THE CULTURE OF POLICYMAKING
IN THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM: PRICE POLICY IN MONGOLIA 7 (IRIS Working Paper No.

32, 1992) [hereinafter MURRELL, CULTURE OF POLICYMAKING] (describing how despite economic
liberalization, the Mongolian government continued to exercise control through official recognition
of commissions and agencies to direct price policy and how the government continued to implement previous economic policies); PETER MURRELL ET AL., PRICE POLICY IN MONGOLIA: A CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTS (IRIS Country Report No. 6, May, 1992) (discussing Mongolia's
continued government control over commercial activity through the use of price control measures).
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ingly ambitious privatization and deregulation programs, state ministries have sought to maintain control over privatized entities by
way of regulation or by the exercise of ownership interests, or by
limiting the scope of enterprises subject to privatization."6 Marketoriented reforms undertaken at the national level can be undermined by regional and local government authorities who continue to
impose controls that the national government has disavowed.' 7 In
approaching economic law reform, it is unwise to overlook the incentive and ability of government authorities at the national, regional,
or local levels to undermine reform efforts that threaten to reduce
their economic and political power.
Recent experience with Ukraine's efforts to draft a new law for
the regulation of natural monopolies illustrates the point. Under
Ukraine's privatization program, natural monopoly entities are exempt from privatization. This exemption places a premium on the
ability of the natural monopoly law drafting group to devise (and
gain acceptance for) a working definition of "natural monopoly"
that properly limits the activities subject to natural monopoly oversight." This problem has two dimensions. The first is to identify
industry sectors that today have natural monopoly traits and to provide a mechanism for adjustment that takes account of changes in
technology and competitive circumstances. The second is to address
the conglomerate, integrated structure of firms that engage in natural monopoly activities.
During the era of central planning in Ukraine and other countries, the absence of strong markets for intermediate inputs and the
government's desire to use firms as engines of social policy caused
state-owned enterprises to pursue self-sufficiency.' 9 Thus, the state
pipeline company in Ukraine controls not only natural gas pipelines,
compressor stations, and scheduling facilities, but also owns the
housing in which its workers live, the retail stores in which they
16. See supra note 15 (describing different methods used in transitional economies to maintain
control despite liberalization of economic measures).
17. See MURRELL, CULTURE OF POLICYMAKING, supra note 15, at 7 (describing how local
government officials in Mongolia seek to control prices despite the elimination of price controls as
a matter of national policy); Starodubrovskaya, supra note 13, at 13 (recounting how local governments impede competition).
18. Cf. Joskow, supra note 14, at 362-66 (describing competition policy issues associated with
natural monopolies in Russia).
19. See Janusz A. Ordover et al., Competition Policy for Natural Monopolies in a Developing
Market Economy, 2 ECON. TRANSITION 317 (1994) (describing how impetus to achieve self-sufficiency has determined structure of public utilities in transitional economics).
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shop, the construction company that services the pipeline and other
purchasers of building services, and the farms that produce the food
consumed by the pipeline company's employees. Ministries responsible for specific economic sectors in Ukraine have a strong interest in
seeing that the concept of "natural monopoly" is defined and interpreted broadly in order to increase the number of sectors exempt
from privatization and to prevent the privatization of business entities that are affiliated with the natural monopoly firm, but perform
no genuinely natural monopoly activities. A narrow definition of
natural monopoly, and the deconglomeratization of firms holding
natural monopoly assets, would reduce significantly the ministries'
base of economic and political power.
2. Strong Residue of Commercial Behavior Shaped By the Planning Era
Many transitional economies have implemented law reforms that
give commercial entities greater freedom to set prices, select output
levels, offer products, and enter markets of their choice." As the
government relaxes controls on firm behavior, some business entities
may show a propensity to attempt to recreate privately the types of
planning mechanisms that the state formerly supplied. Consider the
following examples.
During the November 1992 trip to Mongolia to assist the government in preparing to draft an antimonopoly law, a team of IRIS
researchers conducted case studies in the meatpacking, telecommunications, and wool-spinning industries. 1 In the era of planning,
Mongolia had three large, state-owned slaughtering and meat
processing facilities. At the time of our visit, the government had
privatized the three processing plants while retaining majority ownership of the stock of each plant. Each plant functioned as a standalone firm. By late 1992, the government had ended price controls
on the sale of animals, and herders had begun to shop their herds
around to different meatpacking facilities in search of the best price.
The manager of one meatpacking plant told us that the three
20. See Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 253 ("Many developing countries in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America that once embraced socialism are pursuing market-oriented initiatives that present exciting possibilities for political and economic change."); see also supra note
2 and accompanying text.
21. The results of the case studies are reported in KAREN TURNER DUNN et al., ANALYSIS OF
COMPETITION IN MONGOLIA & THREE CASE STUDIES (Iris County Report No. 14, Apr. 1994).
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meatpacking facilities had begun to bid against each other to
purchase the best animals for slaughtering. Dismayed by this phenomenon, the plant manager assured us that the competition for
good animals would cease. When asked why this was so, the manager said he had just concluded a telephone conversation with his
counterparts at the other two meatpacking plants, and the trio had
agreed on the prices that they would pay to animal herders in the
coming year.
A second example involves Zimbabwe. From the mid-1960s until
the early 1990s, the Government of Zimbabwe (and the predecessor
state of Rhodesia) centrally orchestrated pricing, output, and other
business decisions in most industry sectors. Although private ownership of business was permitted, government regulation of pricing
and production was comprehensive. 2 To implement public controls,
many private enterprises adopted competition-suppressing measures
in trade association by-laws.28 In recent years Zimbabwe has embarked on a broad program to remove price controls and otherwise
deregulate private firms,24 but privately-established limits on business freedom persist. As of early 1992, the rules of the Construction
Industry Federation of Zimbabwe (CIFOZ) forbade its members
from offering discounts off of standard rate schedules and from
making a competing proposal for a project for which the buyer already had begun negotiations with another CIFOZ member.2 5 The
CIFOZ Management Committee also enjoyed power to restrict the
categories of projects (organized by dollar value) for which each
member company could submit bids. 6
3. Pre-Reform Customs and Institutions Relevant to the Growth
of Private Markets
Even in an environment of comprehensive regulation or centralized planning, business managers and individual entrepreneurs de22. See Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 255-56 (discussing the government's
intrusive regulation of Zimbabwe's economy, including price controls, labor controls, and capacity
constraints and restricting foreign exchange).
23. See id. at 260 (noting that competition-suppressing provisions are common features of trade
association by-laws, especially in service industries such as construction).
24. See id. at 258-59 (noting that Zimbabwe's plan includes trade liberalization, currency reform, dismantling entry and exit restrictions, price decontrol, reductions in the civil service
workforce, and the establishment of a mechanism for addressing restrictive business practices in
the absence of comprehensive regulation).
25. Id. at 260 n.24.
26. Id.
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velop customs and institutions that promote efficient resource allocation and can provide valuable foundations for carrying out economic
activity in the post-reform era."1 These market-relevant customs
emerge in several ways. In one setting, customs and institutions take
root in the "informal" sector of a heavily regulated economy.2 8 In
the "informal" sector, economic actors operate at the fringe of legality or in defiance of existing legal commands.29 Participants in
the informal sector often devise market-oriented customs and institutions that can illuminate paths for transforming the heavily regulated "formal sector." 30
A second variant has emerged in countries such as Zimbabwe,
where the state did not assert public ownership over business enterprises in the pre-reform period, but instead superimposed expansive
regulatory commands on private enterprises. In such situations, private ownership of business units was officially sanctioned by the
state and constituted an element of the "formal," legal sector of the
economy. 31 Despite intrusive government regulation, the rudiments
of market institutions developed and survived by virtue of the efforts
of private entrepreneurs. 2
A third source of market-relevant customs and institutions in the
pre-reform era is the product of official or unofficial deviations by
socialist or communist governments from a regime of strict centralization of economic decisionmaking. To increase production and
compensate for the shortcomings of planning, communist or socialist
regimes sometimes tolerate the operation of markets and the development of private customs that serve to improve resource allocation
27. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 17-127 (1989) (documenting the
substantial role of the "informal" sector in Peru's economy).
28. See id. at xxii (defining "informality" as "the refuge of individuals who find that costs of
abiding by existing laws in the pursuit of legitimate economic objectives exceed the benefits" and
noting that "informals" have developed specific interests and organized rules to replace those not
provided by the state).
29. See id. at 17 (explaining that Lima's tremendous urban growth since the 1950s is the result
of people acquiring, developing, and building up their neighborhoods outside of or in defiance of
state laws, through informal settlements).
30. See generally, id. at xxii, 17-127 (giving a thorough description of "informals" and their
development of rules and customs to supplant state guidelines and suggesting that state acceptance of these "informal" practices could be beneficial).
31. See, e.g., id. at 216 (describing development in England, where formation of new laws
authorized rural and suburban industry that had been established to avoid state control and Sweden, by which "informals" were incorporated into the "formal" legal system).
32. See id. at xxii (noting that "informal" sectors of the economy were developed by private
individuals to replace those the state failed to provide).
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and use."3 Such customs sometimes represent efficiency-based solutions that can be adopted as part of the reform process.3 4
Pre-reform commercial customs and institutions can have important implications for the design of legal reforms. First, commercial
actors - especially private entrepreneurs in the formal and informal sectors - can provide a base of political support for economic
liberalization, including measures to promote competition. Second,
individuals who have gained some experience with market processes
can be a source of new entry and expansion in the post-reform economy. Third, private enterprise participants in the formal and informal sectors rarely enjoyed effective recourse to a well-established,
judicially-enforced system of rules governing commercial behavior.
Such firms often devised private customs or institutions to define
property rights and govern their transactions. With economic liberalization, these informal customs can supply a useful basis for establishing formal principles of law. 35
A final reason for examining the operation of the pre-reform
economy is to identify respects in which nascent market processes
promise to protect consumer welfare without the need for additional
government intervention. In particular, the development of robust
competition may obviate the need for expansive consumer protection
measures. In Nepal, many commodities are sold by weight. Retail
merchants typically measure and weigh products at the point of
sale. Consumers frequently express the concern that merchants engage in shortweighting. In interviews conducted with Nepali business owners in February 1994, I saw evidence that competition is
motivating merchants to take greater efforts to establish a reputation for honesty and accuracy in weighing products.
Himal Iron & Steel ("Himal") is one of Nepal's leading
fabricators of iron and steel products. Like many other goods in Nepal, iron and steel products are priced by the kilogram, and buyers
often complain that retailers use rigged scales to measure the weight
33. See, e.g., Douglas Farah, Farmers' Markets Help Ease Cuba's Pain, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
1995, at Al (describing how Cuban President Fidel Castro has begun to permit farmers to sell
produce directly to Cuban consumers at prices set by the supply and demand for food).
34. See ROBERT D. COOTER, AVOIDING TRAGEDY IN THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMONS 3-6
(1994) (describing how nomadic herders in Mongolia developed customary land use rights to ensure efficient use of scarce winter pasture land).
35. One would need to be wary of customs that serve mainly to cartelize individual industry
segments. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (describing formation of competitionsuppressing by-laws by trade associations in Zimbabwe).
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of products, such as steel reinforcement rods, before sale. Retailer
shortweighting poses a problem for Himal, because retailer misconduct casts Himal in a bad light. Retailers realize that they will not
bear the full brunt of purchaser displeasure, as buyers will attribute
at least some of the blame for shortweighting to Himal. To cope
with this agency problem, Himal began weighing its products at the
factory, wrapping the products in plastic at the factory, affixing a
seal that states the weight as measured at the factory, and warning
users that Himal cannot vouch for the weight if the seal has been
broken.
Himal's practice of weighing iron and steel products at the factory is costly (in the time required to weigh products and in the cost
of hiring laborers to do the weighing), but it has increased purchaser confidence in Himal. The approach has succeeded to the
point that buyers often dispense with any weighing of Himal's products at the point of sale and instead trust the seal's representation of
the products' weight. Himal also features this measurement and certification technique in its advertisements. I asked Himal's chief executive if the firm had considered other techniques (such as
purchasing and operating retail outlets) to deal with the agency
problem. He said that Himal owns no retail stores, but that the
company is beginning to identify approved Himal dealers who are
permitted to place a Himal label in their shop windows.
B.

The Public Institution Context

The success of market-oriented legal reforms depends heavily on
the ability of the host country to develop public institutions necessary for the functioning of a new legal regime. Most efforts to establish antitrust and consumer protection legal systems in transitional
economies pose extraordinary institutional challenges for the host
country. Several constraints significantly affect the magnitude and
rate of change.
1. Government Agencies
Several features of government agencies in transitional economies
are important for the design and implementation of antitrust and
consumer protection laws. One major constraint is a severely limited
supply of expertise relevant to the implementation of an antitrust or
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consumer protection program. 6 In the law drafting exercises in
which I have participated, I have been very favorably impressed by
the sophistication of host country experts assigned to the drafting
group.3 7 However, in transitional economies, attorneys or economists
familiar with competition law principles or industrial organization
economics are generally rare.3 8 For example, in Mongolia, the government has delegated the drafting of procedures for implementing
the country's antitrust law to engineers whose previous assignments
had been to monitor the technical performance of Mongolian infrastructure industries such as energy and telecommunications. In a
meeting with the engineers to discuss the implementation procedures in June 1994, it was clear to me that the procedures working
group was very capable and had absorbed a great deal of antitrust
learning in a short time, despite little relief from their regular duties. It was also apparent that the procedures group would benefit
from continuing participation by Western and Mongolian attorneys
and economists.
A second significant feature is that government agencies enjoy
sweeping discretion and abide by few, if any, due process-oriented
controls.3 9 Government ministries usually operate under open-ended
grants of authority with no requirement that they give affected parties the right to oppose or appeal government decisions, or offer a
public explanation for their acts. Regulatory decrees are subject to
frequent, unannounced adjustment and often are not published.
A third condition is that, in the absence of antitrust or consumer
protection institutions, there may be no government entity with a
clear mandate or strong incentive to promote competition and the
development of markets. Other government bodies, such as a privatization commission, sometimes can be counted on to support market-oriented reforms. The creation of an antitrust agency can supply
36. See, e.g., Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 265 (noting lack of competition
policy expertise in Zimbabwe).
37. The Mongolian attorneys, economists, and other experts with whom IRIS worked in drafting an antimonopoly law for that country were strikingly well-versed in policy considerations relevant to the design of antitrust prohibitions. See William E. Kovacic & Robert S. Thorpe, Antitrust Law for a Transition Economy, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 41.
38. See, e.g., Jim Leitzel, Russian Economic Reform: Is Economics Helpful?, 19 EASTERN
ECON. J. 365, 366 (1993) (discussing the lack of experience among Russian economists with the
analysis of markets).
39. See Mancur Olson, The Hidden Path to a Successful Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 55, 67-68 (Christopher Clague & Gorden C. Rausser,
eds. 1992).
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a major institutional counterweight to the many organizations of
government whose interests often lie in opposing or retarding the
emergence of private ownership and business rivalry.
2.

The Courts

Market-oriented law reforms, including antitrust and consumer
protection legislation, often entail some judicial participation either
in resolving disputes at the trial level or reviewing the decisions of
an administrative commission. Two basic conditions affect the skill
of the judiciary's participation in the enforcement of antitrust or
consumer protection commands.
The first constraint is that, like many government ministries, the
judiciary often has little familiarity with economic or legal concepts
relevant to business law, including antitrust or consumer protection.
The courts in most transitional economies will be building essentially from scratch in developing analytical principles for interpreting antitrust or consumer protection statutes.
Important exceptions to this general condition will appear in a
careful study of each country's laws and jurisprudence. For example, Zimbabwe's legal system has several features that would facilitate the implementation of an antitrust law. Derived from RomanDutch common law, Zimbabwean contract doctrine bars certain
agreements deemed to be in "restraint of trade."'4 0 In Zimbabwean
jurisprudence, agreements in restraint of trade generally consist of
unreasonable noncompetition covenants contained in employment
agreements or in contracts for the sale of a business.' Such restrictions are invalid if they are unreasonable in geographic scope or duration.42 In dealing with noncompetition covenants, Zimbabwe's
courts have become familiar with analytical principles that would be
important in applying an antitrust statute that prohibited the formation of cartels and other output-restricting schemes by direct competitors. In distinguishing between "naked" and "ancillary" restrictions in noncompetition agreements, Zimbabwe's courts have
devised a methodology for assessing the procompetitive and anticompetitive features of such agreements. 3 This experience will fa40. Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 57.
41. See Pearson Nherere, No Requiem for the Restraint Doctrine-Yet, 6 ZIMB. L. REV. 1, 1-3
(1988).
42. Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 57.
43. For a general discussion on the importance in antitrust analysis of agreements among com-
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cilitate the operation of a ban on certain restrictive business
practices.
Relevant commercial adjudicatory expertise and a source of postreform rules might be found in ministries that formerly controlled
industry activity. Even planned economies engaged in a form of contracting to govern relationships among input suppliers, fabricators,
and distributors. For example, during the planning era in Mongolia,
a government ministry established schedules by which herders
would deliver their animals to state-owned meatpacking facilities.
The ministry's central orchestration of this process, which involved
coordinating the movement of herds over vast distances to ensure a
steady supply of animals to the processing plants, did not eliminate
the possibility for disputes between the herders and the
meatpackers.
Suppose a herder demanded a higher payment and a relaxation of
the delivery schedule, claiming that unusually harsh weather conditions had increased the herder's costs and slowed the progress of the
herd. 44 If the meatpacker and the herder could not agree to an adjustment of the original price and schedule, the government ministry
would be called upon to settle the dispute. Through the rough
equivalent of an arbitration process, ministry arbiters would focus
on some of the same criteria that common law courts in capitalist
economies use to decide cases involving the attempted renegotiation
of contract terms, such as the foreseeability of the contingency that
prompted the demand for renegotiation, and the relative capability
of each party to cope with the contingency at the lowest cost." The
government officials who gained experience in resolving disagreements, and the rules they devised to decide such disputes, could be
useful in developing post-reform commercial dispute resolution
forums.46
petitors and the distinction between naked and ancillary restraints, see ERNEST GELLHORN &
WILLIAM E. KoVAcIc, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 179-96 (4th ed. 1994).
44. 1 used the problem described in the text during discussions with managers of Mongolia's
meatpacking plants in 1992 and with judges of Mongolia's courts in 1994.
45. The ministry decisionmakers also would be guided by any provision of the annual economic
planning document that may have addressed the contingency in question.
46. In Russia and the Ukraine, the post-reform commercial law courts are antecedents of the
"arbitrage" offices that, among other functions, resolved supplier-fabricator disputes between state
economic enterprises during the era of central planning. On the operation of the "State Arbitrazh" system in the former Soviet Union, see Christopher Osakwe, The Modern Soviet Legal
System in Comparative Perspective, in 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 8.150.1,
8.150.84-89 (Kenneth R. Redden, ed., 1991).
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A second formative condition is that courts in transitional economies usually operate with an austere administrative infrastructure
that severely limits the dissemination of information about the result
or logic of judicial decisions. At the local and regional levels in Nepal and Mongolia, courts seldom publish opinions. Judges in these
tribunals rely mainly on an oral tradition to decide cases. The highest court in the country may have the use of research tools such as
personal computers or communications equipment such as a fax, but
most courts do not. Even where judicial opinions and the statutes
they interpret are published, it is unlikely that distribution of these
materials throughout the nation's legal community will be widespread, current, or complete."7
3. Multiplicity of Law Reform Measures
The agenda of law reforms needed to build a market economy is
especially long in transitional countries. Antitrust and consumer
protection are only two elements of the effort to establish a market
system. To create the legal infrastructure for a market economy, a
formerly communist or socialist country may need to adopt a wide
array of new laws, including measures governing administrative
practice and procedure, banking, bankruptcy, business associations,
contracts, customs, environmental protection, insurance, intellectual
property, judicial reform, labor, privatization, product liability,
property, securities, taxation, and trade. The energies of the national
legislature, key ministries, and indigenous experts knowledgeable
about market processes will be stretched very thin.
4. History of Nonenforcement of Nominal Legal Commands
Citizens in many formerly communist or socialist countries are
accustomed to nonenforcement, or highly selective application, of
laws and regulations. The lack of commitment and institutions to
enforce nominal requirements engenders cynicism about the rule of
law and the usefulness of enacting new legal commands. If imple47. In Zimbabwe, I interviewed one of the country's leading corporate law specialists. At one
point in our conversation, the attorney pulled from the shelf in his office a well-thumbed copy of a
volume containing Zimbabwean statutes dealing with business associations. The volume contained
numerous handwritten annotations, and on many pages the attorney had affixed typed or printed
inserts to the printed text. As new statutes were passed and existing statutes were amended, the
government did not published complete, revised texts of the law. Thus, it fell to practitioners to
annotate the official published texts of the original laws.
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mentation is not forthcoming, the efforts of transitional economies to
adopt new laws to satisfy conditions of loan agreements or structural
adjustment programs may exacerbate public doubts about the efficacy of the legal system. Many countries have passed market-oriented laws, 8 but have failed to establish mechanisms for implementing them. Creating new legal commands without effective
institutions for implementation may be worse than passing no new
laws, given the tendency of hollow rules to undermine confidence in
the law.
C. The Political Context: Enduring Suspicion of Capitalism and
Market Processes and Impulses to Reimpose Controls
In a number of transitional economies, the political consensus
favoring economic and political liberalization is fragile. To many
citizens and public officials, the shift to a market economy has imposed unacceptable economic, social, and political costs. Former
communists who are candidates for elective office have skillfully exploited popular discontent with the costs of the transition process to
regain control of the national legislature and positions of responsibility in key government ministries. Pressure from external donors provides the principal impetus for transitional economies to sustain at
least the outward commitment to reform.
Amid broad political and social resistance to economic liberalization, the development of competition and consumer protection policy
can supply an important bridge to a market system. The availability
of antitrust scrutiny of dominant firm conduct, mergers to monopoly, and cartels can help deflect pressures for the maintenance or
reimposition of price controls. Notwithstanding legitimate fears
about excessively aggressive antitrust oversight, an antimonopoly
system may well be a superior alternative to government efforts to
regulate prices and other business decisions. Indeed, the realistic political alternative to creating an antitrust system may not be doing
nothing at all, but instead more intrusive forms of government control of the economy. The establishment of basic commands against
deception and fraud also can provide some degree of assurance to
the public that they will not be victimized by market failures.
48. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing the adoption of antimonopoly and
consumer protection legislation); see also Matthew S. R. Palmer, Privatization in Ukraine: Economics, Law, & Politics, 16 YALE 1. INT'L L. 453 (1991) (discussing prospects for privatization in
Ukraine with comparisons to experience in Chile and Poland).
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF LAW
REFORMS

The implementation context has a number of implications for how
one designs competition and consumer protection laws and the institutions to execute them.
A.

Studying Existing Economic and Institutional Conditions

The design of market-oriented law reforms should flow from careful
advance study of the host country's economy and existing institutions relevant to the operation of a market system.49 Such study
should include case studies of specific industries and interviews with
academics, consumers, government officials, legal practitioners, and
business managers. The case studies serve to identify problems on
which antitrust and consumer protection reforms should focus, to
assess the institutional capabilities of the host country, and evaluate
needed adjustments in institutions.
Pre-reform study should involve a collaboration between indigenous specialists and external technical advisors. A cooperative effort
to perform case studies and interviews gives indigenous experts the
benefit of experience and theoretical insights from external advisors,
and ensures that external advisors are alert to distinctive circumstances of the host country. Such collaboration is an excellent opportunity for foreign advisors to help indigenous experts to develop
analytical techniques for understanding market processes.5 0 As described below in this section, the participation by external advisors
in pre-reform analysis, law drafting, and implementation will be
most constructive when technical advisory bodies have a continuing,
long-term presence in country.
B.

Tailoring the Law to Reflect National Conditions

The pre-reform analysis should generate useful insights about the
appropriate design of a competition or consumer protection system.
49. For example, the drafting of an antimonopoly law in Mongolia in 1992 and 1993 built
extensively upon research by IRIS in-country representatives, project members, and consultants.
See, e.g., PETER MURRELL, REFORM ISSUES IN MONGOLIA (IRIS Country Report No. 1, 1991)
(identifying priorities for economic and legal reform in Mongolia); PETER MURRELL, ET. AL.,
PRICE POLICY IN MONGOLIA: A CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTS (IRIS Country Report No. 6,

1992) (describing modern evolution of price controls in Mongolia).
50. Cf. ROBERT KLITGAARD, TROPICAL GANGSTERS 102 (1990) ("The only justification for for-

eign experts . . . was as teachers, as builders of analytical capacity.").
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As with the pre-reform analysis, the law drafting process should involve a collaboration between indigenous experts and external technical advisors. 5 ' The draft law that has the strongest prospects for
adoption and implementation is one that emerges, in its principal
elements, from the recommendations of the indigenous experts and
commands their enthusiastic support. In this model, foreign technical advisors do not dictate terms.5 2 Instead, they identify alternatives, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches
to solving problems, illuminate the experience of other countries
with different systems, and ensure that important issues of substance and implementation are addressed."3
In terms of the law's substance, the objects of the law drafting
process should be to correct serious market failures identified in case
studies and interviews and to design an implementation mechanism
that ensures that the law's nominal substantive commands are executed. Perhaps the most important contribution of external technical
advisors in the drafting process is to focus the drafting group's attention on implementation issues. Here the goal is to ensure that the
law's substantive requirements do not outrun the nation's ability to
execute them, either through existing institutions or through the formation of new institutions whose timely establishment reasonably
can be anticipated.
To the greatest extent possible, the law's substantive commands
and implementation mechanism should build upon existing legal
commands and institutions. To minimize transitional difficulties that
accompany the absorption of new legal concepts, the law drafters
should seek to engraft the new law onto existing institutions and
practices. As the following examples indicate, the ideal design of the
51. For a description of the collaborative process through which Mongolia's antitrust law was
drafted, see Kovacic & Thorpe, supra note 2.
52. This may not always be the case. In some instances the government of the host country may
refuse to take an active hand in devising politically unpalatable reforms. In such cases it may be
necessary for donor organizations to "cram down" specific reforms to establish needed elements of
a market-based legal infrastructure and to enable leadership of the host country to deflect political
opposition by characterizing the adoption of a reform as an inescapable concession to external
financiers. KLITGAARD, supra note 50, at 100-03.
53. Robert Klitgaard makes the case for technical assistance that encourages full-fledged "participation" by host country officials:
It had been my experience that decisions are improved by collegial efforts to lay out
issues, clarify choices, and separate the value judgments and the factual questions.
Foreigners like me can help in this, and if one is lucky, in the process the locals learn
how to do it themselves.
KLITGAARD, supra note 50, at 79.
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law may vary considerably from country to country, depending on
existing institutions and legal practice. One issue in law design is
whether the law should provide for enforcement by private plaintiffs
(either before a court or a regulatory commission), or should limit
standing to public officials who investigate complaints of private
parties and initiate their own inquiries. In some transitional countries, such as Mongolia, the idea of private enforcement is largely
alien and would require greater effort to establish as part of an antimonopoly system. By contrast, Zimbabwe permits private enforcement of a number of legal commands, including criminal statutes.
Thus, a private right of action to attack certain antitrust violations
might be much easier to implement in Zimbabwe than in
Mongolia.54
A second example concerns the capability of the country's judicial
system. Where the courts have minimal experience with commercial
law issues, it may be best to commit enforcement authority to an
administrative commission with power to adjudicate complaints internally, with its decisions subject to review by the country's appellate courts. To enhance the legitimacy of commission enforcement
and administrative adjudication, the reform law should incorporate
procedural safeguards to ensure fairness to affected parties and to
promote transparent decisionmaking.
C.

Simplicity

Few transitional economies have a large reservoir of human capital or a well-established institutional infrastructure for implementing new market-oriented legal commands, including antitrust and
consumer protection laws. This dictates that law drafters place a
premium on achieving simplicity in the new legal regime. Achieving
simplicity requires rigorous efforts to focus new substantive commands on the most serious market failures, and to ensure that legal
commands do not overpower the ability of existing or contemplated
institutions to execute them. The aim is to avoid a serious mismatch
between the law's requirements and the capabilities of the institutions to satisfy them.
Even seemingly simple legal commands may involve complexities
that may not be apparent at first glance. Many legal concepts that
54. See Kovacic, Competition Policy, supra note 3, at 264 (describing Zimbabwean practice of
allowing citizens to sue on the government's behalf when the Attorney General does not sue).
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strike external observers as relatively straightforward are not easily
transplanted to transitional economy settings. One of the clearest
and simplest rules in antitrust jurisprudence is the per se prohibition
against agreements by direct competitors to fix prices. 55 Key operative elements of the per se ban on horizontal price fixing are the
definition and proof of agreement.56 In some countries, evidentiary
standards may require the introduction of a writing to establish the
fact of an agreement, placing spoken understandings outside the
reach of a ban upon collusion. Thus, efforts to condemn cartels
orchestrated through a spoken exchange of assurances may require
a major change in the host country's evidentiary standards.
An additional reason for simplicity is that it facilitates self-execution. Donor entities sometimes have funded technical assistance programs to help transitional economy governments to implement new
laws, 57 but the host country cannot count on donors for extensive
commitment or follow through once the new legislation is enacted.
Thus, it is best to design law reform measures on the assumption
that no great amount of follow-on assistance will be forthcoming.
D. Durable Commitment By Advisors Before, During, and After
the Adoption of New Laws
External technical assistance is a major ingredient of law reform
programs in transitional economies. The effectiveness of technical
assistance depends heavily on the establishment by external technical advisors of a long-term in-country presence. Having one or more
persons resident in-country is essential to analyzing indigenous economic and political conditions, identifying reform priorities, participating in the drafting and enactment of legislation, and assisting in
implementation. Maintaining a long-term in-country presence helps
to develop constructive relationships between foreign advisors and
indigenous officials and to overcome the host country's justifiable
suspicion toward expert outsiders who dispense wisdom for a few
days, collect souvenirs and colorful stories, and journey homeward
55. See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 43, at 165-69, 179-87 (describing the content of
and the rationale for the per se rule against horizontal price-fixing).
56. See William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the
Antitrust Laws. 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 7 (1993) (describing the importance of determining
whether behavior in question stemmed from an agreement).
57. See Kathleen E. McDermott, U.S. Agencies Provide Competition Counseling to Eastern
Europe, 6 ANTITRUST 4, 4 (1991) (describing placement of antitrust specialists from the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in antimonopoly bodies in Eastern Europe).
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in the knowledge that they will not have to live with the results of
their advice. The in-country advisor can draw upon foreign specialists for short-term visits, but a program consisting mainly of "parachute" visits by external advisors is prone to misapprehend national
needs, to design laws that are ill-suited to national conditions, and to
slight critical implementation issues. 58
The last issue -

implementation -

deserves special emphasis.

Few technical assistance programs give implementation the attention it deserves.59 The presence of external advisors in the period
following enactment of a new law can be critical for two principal
reasons. First, in countries such as Mongolia and Nepal, statutes
tend to cast important provisions in general terms and delegate the
preparation of operational rules or procedural guidelines to a government agency. The impact and efficacy of a statute can hinge crucially on how these rules and guidelines are drafted, and foreign
advisors can provide a useful perspective on what such documents
might say. Second, the first years of the life of the new enforcement
apparatus may have an enormous effect on its prospects for long
term success. The new agency faces difficult choices about organizing its operating units, designing an enforcement strategy, educating
affected parties about the new legal regime, publicizing its activities,
and educating its professional staff. Foreign advisors can be a valuable resource to agency managers as these matters are addressed. 0
58. Cf. Glenn R. Lawrence, Are We Exporting Our Legal System?, 41 FED. BAR NEWS & J.
672, 679 (1994) (questioning the value of short-term exchange visits to support rule of law
projects in formerly communist and socialist countries).
59. As one commentator noted:
In the usual brand [of technical assistance) an expert comes and carries out a task,
the classic case being writing a report and then leaving. Much rarer was an expert
who worried about implementation, how the report would be used in practice. And
rarer still, at least in Equitorial Guinea, was the expert who worked with the Guineans and trained them.
KLITGAARD, supra note 50, at 185.
60. An informative test of this assertion is unfolding in Ukraine, where IRIS holds an AID
contract to supply technical assistance to Ukraine's Antimonopoly Committee (AMC). IRIS has
placed a team of three American professionals in the AMC headquarters in Kiev. Two are economists (Linda Boner and Roger Boner) who combine extensive experience in the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. Both have made numerous presentations to foreign antitrust officials. Roger Boner has performed a number of in-country competition
policy consultancies and has written widely on the subject of competition policy in transitional
economies. See Roger A. Boner, Competition Policy and Institutions in Transitional Economies,
in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM IN INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (Claudio Frischtak ed.,

forthcoming) (discussing importance of adapting new competition policy system to existing national institutions in transitional economies); Roger A. Boner & James Langenfeld, Liberal Trade
and Antitrust in Developing Nations, in REGULATION 5, 6 (1992) (discussing the roles of trade
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The creation of a long-term, in-country presence depends heavily
on the preferences and choices of donor institutions such as the
World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and individual national assistance entities such as the Agency for International Development. Technical advisors will not take a long-term
view, and cannot invest in a sustained in-country presence, unless
the funding agencies adopt a long-term perspective and commit resources over a period of years to accomplish pre-reform analytical
tasks, law drafting, and implementation. Government managers
have weak incentives to look beyond the relatively short-term - the
two-year term of a posting in a transitional economy, the one-year
assignment as head of a bureau, or the preoccupation of the donor
country's legislature in the immediate year's budget cycle. A project
that arouses great enthusiasm today may lose funding in next year's
budget as the donor organization shifts its attention to the crisis or
policy demand of the moment.
The short-term focus of decisionmaking places a premium on investing in activities that show swift, measurable returns. The donor
might emphasize assistance in adopting a new statute (a measurable
event), but commit few resources to pre-reform economic and legal
analysis or post-reform implementation (activities whose impact is
not readily calculated). In the fields of antitrust and consumer protection, sustained technical assistance that helps the host country
establish effective enforcement institutions may yield few immediate, tangible returns, but such assistance is valuable in raising the
probability that new legal commands will be applied sensibly. Reform efforts must cope with not only the fragile commitment of the
host country to a market system, but also with the short attention
span of donor institutions in seeing any single reform initiative
through to the end. As noted above, the possibility that donor organization support for a specific reform program may be short-lived
suggests the importance of devising relatively simple legal commands and implementing institutions whose success does not depend
heavily on long-term external technical assistance.
liberalization and antitrust in promoting competition). The third professional (George Gamota) is
an attorney who speaks Ukrainian. This team is especially well-suited to assist the AMC in training its professional staff, in developing programs to educate various Ukrainian constituencies on
Ukraine's antimonopoly law, in developing a competition advocacy program before other government bodies, and in formulating an enforcement strategy.
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E. Emphasis On Education and Publicity
Major ingredients of the program for implementing antitrust and
consumer protection reforms should be publicizing the existence of
the new legal regime and educating consumers, business managers,
and government officials about its contents and rationale. Carried
out through booklets, public service announcements, speeches, and
workshops, the education and publicity program can help educate
the nation about the functioning of a market economy and the specific protections of the new legislation. 6 Enforcement authorities
also can help educational institutions develop market-based courses,
such as basic microeconomics for undergraduates and courses in antitrust and consumer protection for law schools.
Another dimension of the education process is building the analytical capability of the antitrust and consumer protection agencies.
Foreign technical advisors can play a valuable role in this effort,
particularly in conducting workshops in which advisors engage the
host country participants in problem solving exercises." Workshops
enable participants to analyze competition and consumer protection
problems and to evaluate alternative solutions. The foreign advisor
can design problems based on experience in other countries and contribute observations about analytical techniques and enforcement
methods that have succeeded in other settings. A longer term goal
of the education process is to build a self-sustaining indigenous
training capability trough which the host country can maintain the
quality of its professional staff in the face of substantial turnover, as
capable employees leave to take new positions outside the
government.
The education and publicity program also can serve to reinforce
positive indigenous trends in the pre-reform era. The enforcement
institutions can teach consumers about their ability to shape producer behavior through changes in purchasing behavior. By teaching
consumers how competition can protect their interests, the enforcement authority can encourage efforts by producers to attract con61. See James Langenfeld & Dennis A. Yao, Competition Policy and Privatization:An Organizational Perspective,in GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS ESTABLISHING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND A MARKET ECONOMY IN FORMER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 195, 214 (H.J.
Blommestein & R. Stuenenberg, eds. 1994) (describing value of educational outreach activities by
competition authorities in transitional economies).
62. See KLITGAARD, supra note 50, at 137, 149 (describing value of workshops as instructional
tools).
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sumers on the basis of superior price and quality attributes. Efforts
to demonstrate the value of advertising can reinforce efforts by producers, such as Himal Iron & Steel, to devise methods for signaling
high quality and truthfulness in dealer with consumers.
F. Emphasis On Advocacy of Market Institutions
Among the most important contributions of an antitrust or consumer protection system is to discourage attempts by other government institutions to stifle competition and otherwise restrict consumer sovereignty.6 3 In many transitional economies, the state
remains a potent threat to the market process." Government agencies at the national, regional, and local levels retain formidable
power to frustrate economic liberalization by imposing new restrictions or interpreting existing legal commands. Sustained efforts by
antitrust and consumer protection authorities to remove state impediments to market rivalry deserve at least as much attention as
the scrutiny of conduct by private economic actors.
G. Development of a Law Enforcement Program
The investigation and prosecution of private misconduct should
follow an initial period of education and publicity. The raw material
for individual cases should emerge from several sources, including
industrial organization studies performed in the pre-reform period,
investigations conducted by the new enforcement agency, and complaints from consumers or business managers generated by the edu63. See Craig W. Conrath & Barry T. Freeman, A Response to the Effectiveness of Proposed
Antitrust Programsfor Developing Countries 19 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 233, 243-45 (1994)
(presenting competition policy advocacy as a valuable element of antimonopoly program in transitional economies); Imrich Flassik, Prioritiesof the Czechoslovak Anti-Trust Office, in THE ROLE
OF COMPETITION IN ECONOMIC TRANSITION 73, 74-75 (Christopher T. Saunders, ed. 1993) (discussing efforts of Czechoslovak Federal Competition Office to reduce customs tariffs for imported
automobiles) Joskow, supra, note 14, at 359-60 (recommending that regional antimonopoly authorities in Russia advocate procompetition policies in sectors such as energy, telecommunications,
and transportation). The value of competition advocacy by competition authorities has been
demonstrated in Western economies as well. Since the early 1970s, the federal antitrust agencies
in the United States have made numerous appearances before federal, state, and local government
authorities to oppose various regulatory impediments to competition. See Report of the American
Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 93-96 (1989) (discussing Federal Trade Commission competition
advocacy activities). In many instances, the United States antitrust agencies promoted a transition
from regulatory strategies - including limits on entry and pricing - that motivated much economic policymaking in the 1930s. Id.
64. Conrath & Freeman, supra note 63, at 243-44.
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cation and publicity effort. To establish the credibility of the new
enforcement institutions, emphasis should be placed on the prosecution of a small number of especially egregious offenses, such as a
bid-rigging cartel or fraudulent advertising of over-the-counter
drugs. Enforcement actions should be widely publicized to establish
business and public awareness of the new antitrust and consumer
protection regime.
H. Ex Post Evaluation
Successful implementation requires continuing efforts to evaluate
the impact of completed enforcement initiatives. Ex post assessments can inform the judgment of enforcement officials about the
future choice of initiatives and can illuminate, for the host country
and external donor organizations, the strengths and weaknesses of
specific law reform measures. Academics and other commentators
have begun to perform informative assessments of the results of
competition policy initiatives and other market-oriented law reforms
in transitional economies."8 To be effective, such assessments require
the cooperation of government agencies in providing access to data
and internal decisionmaking processes. Donor organizations are in a
strong position to elicit such evaluative efforts by making additional
assistance contingent upon the host country's willingness to examine
past activities, both through internal agency self-assessments and by
facilitating analysis by external observers. Of course, a commitment
to encourage ex post evaluations assumes a long-term perspective
that donor organizations have not always exhibited in the past.
CONCLUSION

In principle, antitrust and consumer protection laws can play a
positive role in facilitating the transition from planning to markets.
Whether such measures do so in practice depends vitally on the process by which the laws are drafted and implemented. Successful
65. See generally Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1129 (1994) (assessing
experience with antitrust laws in Central and Eastern Europe); GEORGES KORSUN & PETER MURRELL, THE EFFECTS OF HISTORY, OWNERSHIP AND PRE-PRIVATIZATION RESTRUCTURING ON POSTPRIVATIZATION GOVERNANCE 12-15 (IRIS Working Paper No. 147, 1995) (studying determinants of post-privatization corporate governance structures in Mongolia); BEN SLAY, INDUSTRIAL

30-32 (Middlebury
College Working Paper No. 94-9: 1994) (evaluating impact of structural competition policies on
economic transition in Hungary and Poland).
DEMONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

1224

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1197

drafting demands careful evaluation of existing economic and legal
customs, practices, and institutions to identify serious problems and
devise solutions that are likely to take root in the host country. Effective implementation requires matching the law's commands to
the institutional capabilities of the host country, and sustained efforts following enactment to assist antitrust and consumer protection authorities in executing their responsibilities. The tasks of law
design and implementation cannot be accomplished skillfully from a
distance, nor through short-term interventions by outsiders. To do
either effectively requires a sustained in-country presence by technical advisors, close collaboration with indigenous experts, and a willingness to provide assistance through the critical period in which the
host country's institutions are applying the new law.

